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Understanding how price regulations affect the adoption of new patent-protected 
pharmaceutical technologies is a crucial question in designing health systems. This paper 
addresses this question by examining how price expectations shape the probability of launch, 
controlling for competition, market size expectations, firm and molecule heterogeneity across 
the major OECD markets during 1999-2008. Due to the censoring of launch data we use 
discrete time duration modelling with parametric and semi-parametric duration dependence 
specification. A sub-sample analysis including only EU countries also investigates the impact 
of price interdependencies and potential firm strategies in launch and pricing decisions. The 
empirical analysis of the global set of molecules which have diffused across more than 10 
markets in the OECD, suggests there is a statistically significant and robust price effect in the 
adoption of new pharmaceutical technologies; low-prices result in reduced and slower 
adoption. Concentrated therapeutic subgroups, reflecting market crowding constitutes a 
significant barrier to entry. Sub-sample findings from the EU market suggest strategic firm 
behaviour with firms delaying launch in low-priced markets and attempts to maintain price 
differentials across interdependent markets to a minimum due to price complementarities. 
Firm economies of scale and the therapeutic importance of innovations are other important 
drivers of adoption speed. 
JEL-Code: I110, L510. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
 International launch strategy of new pharmaceuticals, i.e. timing and order of market 
entry, is compounded with difficulties due to the unique and often country-specific 
regulatory nature of the pharmaceutical industry. The majority of the countries in the 
OECD employ pricing and reimbursement (P&R) controls to contain costs, promote 
rational drug use and less frequently to protect the local industry against international 
competition. The recent financial crisis and fiscal austerity measures to tackle budget 
deficits are driving the need for even more stringent price controls. While there is a 
small literature on the effect of regulation on drug prices and competition, the 
evidence regarding the impact of regulation on the launch timing of pharmaceutical 
innovation is scanty.  
The aim of this paper is to improve our understanding of the effects of regulation on 
the speed of adoption of new pharmaceutical products (adoption in this paper is 
specified by the first launch date of a given molecule). The impact of regulation on 
entry and social efficiency has been highlighted by various economists (Djankov et 
al., 2002). Several studies have addressed how regulation affects adoption of 
innovation in different industries (Dewick and Miozzo, 2002; Jaffe and Stavins, 1995; 
Sanchez and Post, 1998; Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Snyder et al., 2003; Wallsten, 
2005; Sheppard et al., 2006). The pharmaceutical industry, however, is one of the 
most heavily regulated industries and provides a perfect test bed to assess how 
regulation affects adoption of innovation.   
Pharmaceuticals deserve specific attention because consumption is channelled 
through an agency relationship and reimbursement is carried out by third party payers, 
which limits financial responsibility on the demand side leading to price insensitivity   3
and moral hazard in consumption. The industry significantly depends on monopoly 
rights granted by patents to recoup costly R&D outlays and maintain sustainability of 
future investments
1. Such monopolistic power, however, allows pricing above 
marginal costs, which has historically focused regulators’ attention on pharmaceutical 
prices as a major means of cost-containment.  
Access to essential medicines is also increasingly recognized as a core part of the 
international right to health (Thomas, 2006). Given the global nature of 
pharmaceuticals and the reliance of the industry on returns to R&D, speedy and 
simultaneous introduction across markets would maximize commercial success. 
Pricing and reimbursement (P&R) regulations post-launch and the dependence of 
prices across markets create a tension between the aims of regulating prices and 
delaying adoption of pharmaceutical innovation, thus jeopardizing access to health 
enhancing pharmaceutical technologies (Danzon et al., 2005; Danzon and Epstein, 
2008). 
This paper will test the hypothesis that regulation has a significantly negative effect 
on the speed of new molecule adoption in markets that apply these regulations and 
investigate the ramifications of price linkages across individual markets created by 
external reference pricing and parallel trade. Drawing upon duration modelling 
applied to IMS (Intercontinental Medical Services) data we estimate the impact of 
regulation, identified by expected launch prices, on the probability of  new molecule 
launch across the main OECD markets during 1999-2008 controlling for market 
structure, firm and molecule heterogeneity. We also further examine a sub-set of 
markets, within the EU, to assess whether firms employ strategic pricing behaviour. 
                                                 
1 R&D investments are estimated to be on the order of $800 million, with a range of $500 million to 
$2,000 million depending on the therapy or the developing firm (Adams and Brantner, 2006; Dimasi et 
al., 2003; Dimasi, 2002).   4
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses prior evidence from 
the literature; Section 3 describes the methods; Section 4 presents empirical results, 
and finally Section 5 discusses main findings of the paper. 
 
2   BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND KEY DRIVERS OF ADOPTION  
Lags in the adoption of pharmaceutical innovation can have different components in 
different countries, depending on specific local regulations. Several studies in the 
literature have addressed delays due to the review process (Dranove and Meltzer, 
1994; Thomas et al., 1998; Carpenter et al., 2003; Carpenter and Turenne, 2004; 
Bolten and Degregorio, 2002), while more recent studies have emphasized price 
controls and variations in reimbursement schemes (Danzon et al., 2005; Danzon and 
Epstein, 2005; Danzon and Epstein, 2008; Lanjouw, 2005). In most OECD countries, 
firms face additional delays due to pricing and reimbursement approval. These 
controls not only affect the local commercial demand factors but also increase the 
interdependency across international markets due to knock-on effects of external 
reference pricing and parallel exports.  
2.1   Identification of Regulation 
Treatment Dummies for Price Controls 
Two categories of studies exist with respect to how regulation is identified. The first 
category uses treatment dummies for price control at the time of launch (Lanjouw, 
2005; Heuer et al., 2007; Kyle, 2007). Lanjouw (2005) includes treatment dummies 
for the stringency of price control to measure the impact of limited price control 
versus extensive price control in high-income and low-middle income countries. 
Heuer, Mejer et al. (2007) control for direct price regulation (international price 
comparisons, therapeutic value/cost-effectiveness, pharmaceutical contribution to the   5
economy) and indirect price regulation (profit control, reference pricing) in a probit 
analysis to test how different P&R schemes affect the probability of launch for new 
chemical entities approved by the centralized EMEA procedure within the former 
EU15 during 1995-2004. Kyle (2007) estimates a discrete-time survival model using 
data in 28 countries over 1980-2000 using price ranks and regulation dummies, such 
as prescription budgets, reference pricing, price freezes and controls. Studies in this 
first category identify a significant effect of price controls on the probability of 
launch. Countries with the highest probability of launch impose the lowest regulation 
on prices and indirect price controls do not affect launch delays significantly for on-
patent drugs (Heuer et al., 2007). Kyle (2007) observes that launch in a price-
controlled country significantly reduces the likelihood of introducing products in 
additional markets. 
Expected Launch Prices 
Treatment dummies and static price ranks control for regulation only roughly and 
potentially inaccurately given the dynamic and multidimensional nature of regulation. 
Price ranks may be highly heterogeneous with respect to therapeutic subgroups or 
across time. In addition, treatment dummies frequently exhibit multi-collinearity with 
country effects. There is a preliminary body of literature which has incorporated 
product-specific data on actual prices to identify the impact of regulation empirically 
(Danzon and Epstein, 2008; Danzon et al., 2005). 
These studies differ broadly in their methodological approach and the mix of products 
and markets included in the analysis. Danzon, Wang  et al (2005) proxy for expected 
price by the lagged average price per standard unit (SU)
2  for the therapeutic class 
                                                 
2 IMS standard unit is the smallest dose for each form, for example, one tablet, one capsule, or 5 ml of liquid   6
(ATC3) in quarters 3 and 4 prior to the first global launch, whereas the other two 
studies use the average competitor prices in ATC4 prior to local launch. Danzon, 
Wang et al. (2005) use the continuous time Cox proportional hazard (PH) model 
whereas the later study uses discrete-time implementation of the PH model by 
complementary log log regression.  
Findings from the second category suggest that the hazard of launch is positively 
related to expected price. In addition to regulatory market barriers, late entry may be 
due to strategic firm behaviour to avoid knock-on effects of price spillovers due to 
reference pricing and parallel trade. Overall, market size has a less robust effect on 
likelihood of launch. Danzon, Wang et al. (2005) identify a significant market size 
effect, whereas Danzon and Esptein (2008) conclude total volume of drugs in a 
therapeutic subgroup is not a significant factor. Similarly, evidence regarding home 
advantage in terms of quicker launch for firms headquartered in the destination 
market is more controversial. Danzon, Wang et al (2005) and Kyle (2007) identify a 
clear home advantage, while Danzon and Epstein (2008) conclude launch is faster 
only in certain regulated markets with strong pharmaceutical industries and industrial 
policies that support local firms, e.g.  France, Italy, Spain. 
This paper aims to address some of the methodological shortcomings of previous 
studies and provide additional evidence using a different drug mix and a more up-to-
date analysis period. We prefer to use duration modelling to the probit model used by 
Heuer, Mejer et al. (2007) because of information loss induced by defining success as 
local launch within 8 months of first global launch. Also, we aim to control for drug 
and firm level heterogeneity to avoid omitted variable bias. In contrast to the approach 
followed by Kyle (2007), we consider only the first indication of molecules in each 
market as new indications face lower barriers and costs to entry both pre- and post-  7
authorization. Price negotiations for add-on indications may be quicker due to 
familiarity with the molecule. This approach also avoids attenuation in standard errors 
due to the potential correlation in errors for different indications of a given molecule-
country pair.  
 
3   METHODS 
3.1   Data 
The IMS data used in this study covers quarterly USD ($) and SU sales of new 
molecules in 13 different ATC1 therapeutic categories during 1999 Q1 – 2008 Q3. 
The dataset comprises 20 countries which represent the major pharmaceutical markets 
in the OECD (except for South Africa)
3. Each product is identified by the  molecule 
name, IMS generic classification, global and local launch dates, therapeutic class 
(ATC4), and breakdown of sales by the distribution channel (retail versus hospital). 
Spain, Turkey, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain, South Africa have only retail 
channel data
4; for Sweden retail and hospital sales are combined.  The ex-
manufacturer price level for molecules is calculated by dividing the ex-manufacturer 
USD sales of the molecule by sales volume in SU. This essentially assumes for each 
molecule a volume weighted average price across all products with the same active 
ingredient. We consider only ex-manufacturer price levels and ignore margin controls 
and marketing discounts along the distribution chain.  
                                                 
3 The country set in alphabetical order is: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and US 
4 Launch in these countries therefore represents launch in the retail sector.    8
OECD statistical extracts were used to get additional data for GDP per capita
5. Sales 
data was deflated using GDP deflators from the International Monetary Fund World 
Economic Outlook Database 2008
6.  Observations with negative sales representing 
products returned to the manufacturer after withdrawal from the market, and which 
accounted for about 5% of the total number of observations, were dropped.   
The global launch date of a given molecule defines the onset of risk for subsequent 
launches in other markets. The launch dates are recorded monthly. Molecule-country 
pairs comprise the unit of analysis. Failure time for molecule j-country k pair is 
defined as the difference between the global launch date of molecule j and the local 
launch date of molecule j in country k. The molecule set is restricted to molecules that 
have launched in at least ten markets, which is a more stringent measure of global 
importance compared to prior studies. Prior studies at best consider either molecules 
that have launched in the US or UK. Due to the different dynamics after the 
establishment of a single European market in 1993, the molecule set is further 
restricted to include molecules that first launched post-1993.  
The dataset is first brought into a suitable format to do non-parametric survival 
analysis and is then expanded to define monthly time intervals following the global 
launch date until the local failure (launch or censoring) to account for the interval-
censored nature of the launch timing data. Quarterly average price is assumed for each 
month in the same quarter. 
                                                 
5 Available at http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx 
6 Real sales figures were calculated as : Real Sales = Nominal Sales*100/GDP deflator   9
3.2   Model 
Entry of a molecule in a given country can be considered as a binary-outcome model 
defined as unity if entry occurs at time t and zero otherwise. Letting  jkt Π  represent 
the discounted post-entry profits for molecule j in country k if entry occurs at time t, 
the entry decision  jkt d  is defined as:  
⎩
⎨
⎧ ≤ = > Π
=
otherwise 0




  jkt Π  is composed of the discounted future profit stream, net of any costs of entry. 
jkt Π  is a latent variable which is not observed directly; only the launch decision  jkt d  
is observed.  In an isolated market, the discounted future profit stream ignoring 
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δ , where P is the expected local price; Q is 
the expected market size for molecule j in country k; E is the fixed cost of entry; LT is 
the expected life-time of the molecule in the destination market and δ  is the discount 
factor. Companies would like to launch as quickly as possible for two reasons:  
raising prices post-entry is difficult either due to regulation or competition and a 
longer protection period avoids generic competition’s effect on prices and market 
shares. However, in interdependent markets such as the EU, there would be an 
additional loss term (L) due to external referencing or parallel trade between the 
destination market k and markets r that have already adopted the technology and 
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PQ L E, which shows the international 
character of pricing and launch strategies of new pharmaceutical products. The size of   10
the loss L would depend on prices and market sizes in countries k and r. Companies 
could forego launch in small sized and low-priced markets to preserve profits in 
bigger markets with higher prices.  
The expected price P is also a function of price controls and the degree of competition 
in the therapeutic subgroup. One of the key product attributes of on-patent 
pharmaceutical technologies is quality. A quality advantage (addressing unmet needs 
or offering improved effectiveness and/or fewer side effects) potentially results in a 
price mark-up. Even in price controlled markets, especially if pharmaceutical sector 
plays an important role in the economy, price mark-ups are given as an incentive to 
stimulate pharmaceutical innovation. 
The expected market size Q depends on total sales in the therapeutic category, which 
is a function of the population and the prevalence rate of the condition as well as 
demand-side controls that may define limits on Q through price-volume agreements. 
Depending on economies of scale, firms can invest in promotional efforts to influence 
prescribing decisions of physicians to increase sales volume.  
Defining row vectors of regulation, competition, molecule, firm characteristics 
respectively as R ,C,M, and F, the additive reduced-form profit function can be 
specified as:  
, | | jkt t jkt jkt t F t jk M t jk C jkt R jkt jkt u u + + = + + + + + = Π γ γ β z β F β M β C β R  
where  R β ,  C β ,  M β , and  F β represent corresponding column vectors of parameters 
to be estimated.  t γ  is a function of t, time since global launch of molecule j. Given 
that launch has not occurred up to interval t, the conditional probability of launch 
during interval t, i.e. the interval hazard rate is:   11
 
) 0 Pr( ) ( ) | 1 Pr( | | > + + + + + = = ≥ = jkt t F t jk M t jk C jkt R jkt jk jk jkt u t h t T d γ β F β M β C β R
) 0 Pr( ) ( > + + = jkt t jkt jk u t h γ β z
) ( ) ( 1 ) Pr( ) ( t jkt t jkt t jkt jkt jk F F u t h γ γ γ + = − − − = − − > = β z β z β z  
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of u and  jk T  is the launch time of 
molecule j in country k.  
For the cloglog model   () jkt t F γ + z β = { } 1 exp exp( ) jkt t γ −− + z β  and thus the hazard 
rate can be defined as: 
)) exp( exp( 1 ) ( t jkt jk t h γ + − − = β z .  
The marginal effect of h with respect to zj is given by:  








z β z β ,  which implies that the marginal effect 
has the same sign as the parameter estimate.  The empirical analysis assumes two 
different duration specifications: i) a parametric specification for  2
12 t tt γ γγ =+ ; and  
ii) a semi-parametric specification that includes dummies for each year following 
global launch. 
We classify variables that define the decision of entry broadly as external 
environment and internal environment factors. External environment variables are 
those defined outside the boundaries of the firm, whereas internal environment 
variables are defined by firm strategies and internal managerial decisions. This 
approach brings together the conceptual framework used in the marketing and 
strategy literature with the findings from the industrial organization (IO) literature 
regarding the drivers of market entry (Wong, 2002; Chryssochoidis and Wong, 1998).   12
A list of descriptive statistics for the variables is provided in the Appendix (Table 
A.I). External environment variables include regulation, market environment and 
competition, whereas internal environment is defined by variables that control for 
firm and molecule heterogeneity.  
 
4   RESULTS 
Table I presents the base case estimates of marginal effects estimated by 
complementary log log regression for molecules that first launched globally after 
1993. The results are presented both with respect to quadratic duration specification 
with a second-order polynomial in time since global launch, and a semi-parametric 
specification.  
4.1   Regulation and Market Size 
The net effect of regulation is defined by expected launch prices as static treatment 
dummies would not capture the complexity in pricing mechanisms and the variation 
over time, across therapeutic categories, firms and countries. Expected prices are 
calculated as the average non-generic competitor prices in the same ATC4 lagged by 
one quarter. Generic products are excluded from average price calculations since 
inclusions of generics in expected price calculation would underestimate expected 
prices in countries with loose price regulation but strong generic penetration and 
would result in imprecise coefficient estimates. Expected market size for a new 
molecule is defined as quarterly lagged total SU sales within the molecule’s ATC4 in 
individual markets. ATC4 is used to define the potential market since competition and 
substitution effects are strongest at the ATC4 level.    13
Regulation is seen to have a significant and robust effect on timing of launch. In all 
regression specifications the estimates for price and volume are highly significant (p= 
0.001). A unit increase in the log expected launch price and the log of expected 
market size increases the probability of launch by 0.003 and 0.002 respectively (see 
Table I). This is close in value to 0.0053, the marginal effect of expected price for 
superior molecules in Danzon and Epstein (2008). Standard error estimates of 
expected price are slightly lower because we cluster by molecule-country rather than 
by molecule since autocorrelation may exist between consecutive error terms of a 
molecule-country pair. The effect of log GDP per capita ($) is positive but not 
significant, and therefore excluded in the second specification.  
 [TABLE I here] 
4.2   Competition 
Competition, proxied by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HH I ), has a significant 
effect on the likelihood of launch. It is a stylized fact in the IO literature that high 
concentration reduces the equilibrium level of entry in several industries; however, no 
prior study has tested this in the pharmaceutical sector by specifically considering the 
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2 , where  i s is the market share of molecule i and N is the number of 
molecules in the therapeutic subgroup ATC4. Subgroup concentration, as expected, 
constitutes a barrier to entry. A unit increase in the log of  HH I  reduces the hazard 
rate by 0.005 in the quadratic specification and by 0.004 in the semi-parametric one, 
which implies the more competitive the subgroup, the higher is the likelihood of quick 
launch.    14
We carry out robustness checks by controlling for the number of substitute molecules 
and investigate whether generic competition is significant (Table A.II). We consider 
only quadratic duration specification for robustness checks as base case estimates 
suggest the fit of quadratic and semi-parametric specifications are comparable. 
Intermolecular competition is found to be more influential on the decision of entry 
compared to the extent of generic competition proxied by the number of substitute 
molecules with generic competition. Consistent with findings of Kyle (2007) the 
number of competitor molecules in the same ATC4 significantly increases the hazard 
of launch, while the number of molecules with generic competition has no significant 
effect on the launch decision of new molecules.   
4.3   Firm Characteristics  
Firm effects play a key role in the strategic entry decisions within the pharmaceutical 
sector (Kyle, 2006; Kyle, 2007; Scott Morton, 1999). Large-firm advantage in 
pharmaceutical regulation has been suggested due to familiarity of the regulator with 
large firms and regulators favouring early entrants (Carpenter and Turenne, 2004).  
Similarly, scale effects suggest an advantage in promotional activities to influence 
physician prescribing levels. Larger firms have better prospects of entry through 
licensing in foreign markets and cost advantages to overcome costs of entry that 
constitute a significant barrier to entry in the pharmaceutical sector.  
Economies of scope imply potentials for R&D and knowledge spillovers across 
different drugs. Learning effects through multiple launches in a given market can 
enable firms to come up with more efficient launch strategies. Similarly, clinical trial 
data obtained in one country can generally be used for launch in further markets.    15
The base case analysis controls for firm effects by log number of countries the firm 
has launched in. Firm heterogeneity is found to be highly significant; a unit increase 
in the log number of countries a firm has launched in (equivalent to multiplying 
geographical reach by 2.72) increases the hazard of launch by 0.011, which is close to 
the 0.009 estimate of Kyle (2007). Firms with a wider global reach have a strategic 
advantage compared to more locally oriented firms.  
Robustness checks were carried out by controlling for log firm sales in 2007, total and 
local numbers of firm molecules firms have launched to control for economies of 
scope (Table A.III). All scale and scope variables are robustly positive and 
significant. Portfolio diversity (number of prior molecules launched) is associated 
with quicker launch, which is in contrast to findings of Kyle (2007). We find no 
evidence of advantage through domestic launch. 
4.4   Molecule Characteristics 
Therapeutic quality is the main factor that defines product differentiation and strategic 
positioning of a new pharmaceutical technology. In addition, therapeutic importance 
of molecules affects the timing of P&R decisions as it is a key criterion in many 
countries. Products that offer therapeutic novelty or public health advantages with 
significant implications for health budgets may be eligible for a fast track approval 
and receive a price mark-up compared to existing products.  
In the base case analysis presented in Table I molecule’s global sales in 2007 are used 
to control for molecule characteristics since therapeutic importance and commercial 
success are highly positively correlated. A unit increase in the log molecule sales 
globally increases the hazard of launch by 0.004. In the robustness checks, we proxied 
for therapeutic importance using the total number of markets in which a molecule has   16
launched, i.e. global extent of launch (Table A.IV). The extent of global reach, as 
expected, was found to have a significantly positive effect on the probability of launch 
with a marginal effect of 0.059.  
4.5   Time Effects 
Time may affect regression estimates in several ways. First, macroeconomic trends in 
the sector may have an impact on price levels. This is accounted for by including 
dummies for each calendar year in all regressions. Second, time captures information 
about the relative innovativeness of new molecules. When a new molecule is about to 
launch, it represents incremental (or breakthrough) innovation compared to the 
molecules in its therapeutic subclass. The longer the time lapse from global launch, 
the higher is the probability that new competitors will enter to compete against the 
molecule lowering its comparative therapeutic advantage.  
The impact of time elapsed since first global launch is captured by interacting both 
expected price and volume with time since global launch. A dummy variable (First 
Launch Before 1999) is included to test if the hazard of launch is statistically different 
for molecules that launched globally after 1999 compared to the ones that launched 
first globally during [1993, 1999). Remember that the set of molecules was restricted 
to the ones that first launched after the establishment of the EU in 19993 and that all 
the failures, i.e. local launches, are post-1999. Therefore, molecules with first global 
launch pre-1999 are left-truncated. Left-truncation is dealt with by omitting the 
subject from all binary outcome analyses during the truncation period since the 
subject could not have failed during that period (Cleves et al., 2008). 
Time interactions of price and volume are significantly negative, which suggests that 
the impact of price and volume decays over time following the global launch of the   17
molecule.  Molecules that launched first before 1999 have a significantly lower 
hazard rate compared to molecules that launched after 1999; the marginal effect is in 
the range of -0.018 to -0.014 depending on the model specification (see Table I).  
Parameter estimates of t and t
2 suggest concave duration dependence, while the 
hazard of launch initially increases and then decreases, which is in contrast to prior 
findings of Danzon and Epstein (2008) who observed that hazards first decrease then 
increase with time since global launch. This might be because the molecules in this 
analysis are more recent, and hence potentially more innovative, and have a higher 
extent of global reach overall (all molecules have launched in at least 10 markets). 
Thus to summarise, ceteris paribus,  price reductions and low competition increases 
time-to-entry, while larger market size, higher therapeutic importance and the greater 
the number of markets a firm operates in reduces time-to-entry. Products that first 
launched globally since 1999 appear to have been adopted internationally more 
quickly than those in the period 1993 to 1999.  
4.6   EU Subsample Analysis 
Finally, the country set was restricted to EU countries to check for the impact of price 
interdependency across markets (Table A.V). There is strong evidence that external 
referencing slows down adoption of innovation. Launch in a high-priced EU market 
increases the hazard by 0.042 compared to launch in a lower priced EU-market for 
molecules. This effect increases to 0.051 for molecules that first launched after 1999, 
suggesting an increase in the strategic importance of price in the timing of entry.  
From a strategic perspective, firms may risk the loss of competitive innovative edge 
as delays increase the chance of facing further competition later in time (Kyle and 
National Bureau of Economic, 2007). This suggests a second firm strategy, which   18
involves pursuing convergence of prices in the EU market following launch to avoid 
knock-on effects due to parallel trade and external referencing, even if at the expense 
of foregoing some short-term local profits in some markets. We test for this strategy, 
by controlling for the extent of deviation between expected local price and the 
average EU price for the launching molecule (Table A.VI). The absolute difference 
between the local expected price and average EU price significantly decreases the 
hazard of launch; the sign of this difference remains insignificant. Launch and pricing 
strategies are multi-market optimization decisions; the trend to drive prices closer 
across different geographies may potentially reduce global prices.  
 
5   DISCUSSION 
This paper aimed to investigate how regulation, in particular price regulation, affects 
the adoption of pharmaceutical products across the main OECD markets during 1999-
2008. We empirically show evidence of relative delays in the adoption of a potentially 
global set of molecules have diffused to more than 10 markets in the OECD, 
controlling for external and internal firm environment.  
Results suggest a statistically significant and robust effect of price on timing of 
launch. High ex-ante price expectations increase the speed of pharmaceutical adoption 
internationally. Hence, we can conclude that regulations that create price linkages 
across markets may thus result in delayed access to pharmaceutical innovation 
because of profit implications in subsequent markets and strategic firm behaviour to 
avoid profit loss.  Our results would indirectly support this argument, but also indicate 
a significant and robust market size effect that increases the likelihood of new 
pharmaceutical adoption as market size increases.    19
We observe significant firm and molecule heterogeneity in the speed of launch. In 
particular, firm economies of scale and molecule’s therapeutic importance grant 
substantial advantages for timely roll-out internationally. Contrary to what the prior 
literature suggests, we find no significant advantage to domestic launch. Higher 
therapeutic subgroup concentration constitutes a market barrier to timely adoption of 
new technologies, which confirms the importance of policies directed at fostering 
competition in the pharmaceutical sector.  
Findings in this paper suggest several policy implications. First, price regulations 
slow down pharmaceutical adoption on a global scale and may impose welfare losses, 
particularly when the innovations that are delayed are cost-effective from a societal 
perspective. The new value based pricing system proposed by the UK government 
could have significant knock-on effects in countries that reference the UK, which 
make up approximately 25% of the global market according to the Office of Fair 
Trading (O.F.T, 2007; Hirschler, 2010). 
Delays in adoption reduce the net present value of R&D investments by delaying cash 
flows and shortening the exclusivity period, which reduces future R&D and 
innovation (Giaccotto et al., 2005). Therefore, although price controls may increase 
static efficiency in the short term by driving prices and marginal costs closer, they 
could also result in potential losses in dynamic efficiency due to reduced incentives to 
entry.  
From a public health perspective, lack of access to new drugs may lead to 
compromises in health outcomes (Schoffski, 2002), shift volume to older molecules 
of lower therapeutic value (Danzon and Ketcham, 2004) and compromise the quality 
of health care (Kessler, 2004; Wertheimer and Santella, 2004). Innovative   20
medications offer economic benefits by avoiding expenditures on other forms of 
medical care (such as hospitalization) as well as reducing missed work days (Hassett, 
2004; Lichtenberg, 1996; Lichtenberg, 2003; Lichtenberg, 2005). Again, in a wider 
context, the assessment of short-term efficiency gains brought about through price 
regulation should be weighed against potential long-term implications on public 
health outcomes and dynamic efficiency. This study has merely provided evidence on 
the impact of price on time-to-market launch, and the continuation of debate over 
static and dynamic efficiency gains falls outside the scope of this paper. 
Second, our analysis confirms that extensive price controls could reduce incentives to 
entry and result in a less competitive environment to stimulate further innovation. 
Third, local controls can affect firms’ launch decisions in foreign markets and impose 
welfare losses, especially in lower-priced markets. Finally, due to scale advantages in 
international roll-out strategies, price controls may increase incentives for mergers 
and acquisitions, further increasing concentration levels and barriers to entry.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we exploit the variation 
both over time and molecule-country pairs. The robustness of the results has been 
assessed by different duration specifications and alternative proxies for risk factors. 
Second, the dataset is more comprehensive and up-to-date than comparable empirical 
studies in the literature. Third, the analysis makes use of reliable price and volume 
information. The price effect is calculated controlling for firm and molecule 
heterogeneity that could bias the estimates if omitted. Finally, the analysis is carried 
out for potentially global molecules, which ensures findings are relevant from an 
international perspective.  
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TABLES  
 
Table I. Marginal Effects for Base Case Regression Results 
 
Marginal Effects in 
Cloglog (quadratic in t) 
Marginal Effects in 
Cloglog (semi-parametric)  Molecules with Global Launch 
post-1993 
1 2 1  2 
Log Lagged Average Non-Generic 
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[0.0058]    0.001 





























































Calendar Year Dummies 
a yes  yes  yes  yes 
ATC1 Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Post Global Launch Yearly 
Interval Dummies 
b  no no  yes yes 
Number of observations  54594  51132  54594  51132 
Log Likelihood  -10131.277  -9619.788  -10076.972  -9568.201 
chi2 1132.456  1077.675  25042.756  1.99E+09 
p 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Akaike’s Information Criterion  20364.554  19341.577 20279.943  19262.401 
Bayesian information criterion  20818.846  19792.527 20841.127  19819.458 
 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.  
  Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at molecule-country level 
                    a Dummies available upon request 
b For semi-parametric duration specification 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.I. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Data used in Survival Analysis 
External Environment   Variable Name   Descriptive Statistics 
Regulatory Environment  Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max 
Expected Price   Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4
a 0.43  2.5  -10.161  8.16 
Relative Price  High Price EU  0.29  0.46  0  1 
Price Setting   External Referencing  0.83  0.37  0  1 
Market Environment 
Expected Market Size  Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4  7.03  3.27  -6.91  14.7 
GDP per capita  Log GDP per capita ($)  10.13  0.39  8.99  10.74 
Competitive Environment 
Market Concentration  Log Molecule Concentration in Ctry-ATC4(IHH)  10.058  1.158  5.72  15.94 
Intermolecular Competition  Log Number of Molecules in Ctry-ATC4  1.401  1.795  -4.61  5.42 
Generic Competition  No. of Molecules with Generic Comp in Ctry-ATC4  0.647  2.253  -4.61  5.29 
Internal Environment 
Firm Characteristics 
Economies of Scope  Log Firm Sales (global) in 2007  14.9  3.21  -4.56  17.45 
  Log Number of Countries Firm has Launched in  2.45  1.03  0  3 
Economies of Scale  Log Firm's Total Number of Molecules  5.49  1.47  0.00  7.22 
  Log Local Firm Experience (number of molecules launched)  4.09  1.33  0  6.65 
Location of Firm Headquarters  Domestic Launch  0.11  0.31  0  1 
Molecule Characteristics 
Therapeutic/Commercial Importance  Log Global Molecule Sales in 2007  11.038  2.194  -4.88  16.26 
  Log Molecule's Global Reach (total markets launched in)  2.713  0.211  2.3  3 
Period of Global Launch (old vs new)  First Launch Before 1999  0.67  0.47  0  1 
Note: 
a All lags are by one quarter.    28
Table A.II Robustness Check: Market Structure and Competition 
Marginal Effects in Cloglog (quadratic in t) 
 Variables  
1 2 3 4 
















Log Molecule Concentration in Ctry-









Log Number of Molecules with Generic 
Comp in Ctry-ATC4     0 
[0.0005]    
Log Number of Molecules in Ctry-




Log Lagged Avg Price/SU * ln(t)         -0.001** 
[0.0003] 
Log Lagged Total SU * ln(t)         -0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
First Launch Before 1999         -0.014*** 
[0.0034] 








Years since global launch squared (t








Country  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ATC1  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar  Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  Observations  54721 38098 54721 54721 
LogLikelihood  -10290.07 -6731.46 -10246.68  -10225.81 
Akaike's  Info  Crit  20672.15 13556.92 20587.35 20551.62 
Bayesian  Info  Crit  21082.01 13958.68 21006.12 20997.12 
 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.  
  Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).  
 Non-exponentiated  parameter estimates reported 
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      Table A.III Robustness Check: Firm Effects 
Marginal Effects in Cloglog (quadratic in t)  Variables 
1 2  3  4 
Log Lagged Avg Non-






























Log Number of Countries 









Log Local Firm Experience 


























Log Lagged Avg Non-
Generic Price/SU in Ctry-
ATC4 * ln(t)  
     -0.001** 
[0.0003] 
Log Lagged Total SU in 
Ctry-ATC4 * ln(t)        -0.001*** 
[0.0002] 
First Launch Before 1999        -0.013*** 
[0.0028] 








Years since global launch 









Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
ATC1 Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Calendar Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  58521  58530  58530  58521 
LogLikelihood -10487.9  -10502.04  -10526.97  -10463.85 
Akaike's Info Crit  21067.79  21098.08  21147.94  21027.70 
Bayesian Info Crit  21480.74  21520.01  21569.87  21476.56 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-
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Table A.IV Robustness Check: Molecule Characteristics 
Marginal Effects in Cloglog (quadratic in t)   
1 2  4 




























































Number of Obs  58279  58530  58530 
LogLikelihood -10433  -10485  -10467 
Akaike's Info Crit  20958  21061  21031 
Bayesian Info Crit  21370  21474  21471 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.  Standard errors clustered at molecule-
country level (standard errors in brackets).  Non-exponentiated parameter 
estimates reported. Country, ATC1 and calendar-year dummies included 
 
   31
Table  A.V Robustness Check: Regulation EU subsample 
Marginal Effects 
 by Cloglog (quadratic in t)  Variables 
1 2 3 
(post-99) 
































Years since global launch 
squared (t







Number  of  Obs  39189 39189 23767 
LogLikelihood  -7420.85 -7420.85 -4899.87 
Akaike's Info Crit  14919.69  14919.69  9877.746 
Bayesian Info Crit  15254.16  15254.16  10192.71 
Note:    *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.  Standard errors clustered at molecule-
country level (standard errors in brackets).  Non-exponentiated parameter 
estimates reported . Country, ATC1 and calendar-year dummies included 
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Table  A.VI EU Subsample: Test for Expected Price Deviations from the Average Price 
of the Launching Molecule 
Parameter Estimates by Cloglog  
(quadratic in t)   Variable 
1 2 










Absolute Difference btw Local Expected Price and 
Average EU Price ( ∆P = Local Expected Price – 


















Years since global launch squared (t




Country Dummies  Yes  Yes 
ATC1 Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Calendar Year Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  27322  27322 
LogLikelihood -5624.5  -5624.58 
Akaike's Info Criteria  11326.99  11327.16 
Bayesian Info Criteria  11647.40  11647.56 
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country 
level (standard errors in brackets). Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported . 
a Sign Defined to be 1 if ∆P ≥0 and 0 otherwise.  
 
 